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Focused on the case of China’s financial development, the present discursive essay sets out 
to argue that if the Chinese financial system distorted the allocation of funds then economic 
growth could not be sustained and financial depth would remain deficient. The essay puts 
forward selected financial facts and policies, discusses their relevance in the particular context 
of China’s economic development goals and concludes that although the Chinese financial 
system is not developed according to the standards of industrialized countries, financial 
intermediation has nevertheless been efficient in terms of promoting savings and credit to the 
extent that might have been good enough to facilitate economic growth. Furthermore, in order 
to reconcile China’s financial efficiency-growth apparent paradox, the essay supports the view 
that analyzing China’s financial system using market-based standards may not be valid. 
 






The theoretical argument for linking financial development to economic growth is that a 
well-developed financial system performs several critical functions to enhance the efficiency of 
intermediation by reducing information, transaction, and monitoring costs. The above link 
suggests that economic growth rarely (if ever) occurs without a well-functioning financial 
system (see McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; King & Levine, 1993; Levine et al. 2000; Beck et al. 
2000). Put in different terms, if the financial system distorts the allocation of funds and financial 
repression is in place then economic growth could not be sustained and financial depth (as 
defined by Shaw, 1973) would remain deficient.  
The strong economic performance occurring in China over the last two decades (China’s 
real GDP growth averaged at 9.4 %) is extremely difficult to reconcile with the standard view 
that China’s financial system grossly distorts the optimal allocation of loanable funds and that 
its financial sector has been seriously inefficient. The essay attempts to address the following set 
of questions.  
• How to better understand the Chinese financial system?  
• To what extent did financial policies implemented in China contribute to the achievement 
of the country’s development goals?  
• Does the strong economic growth in China reflect the effectiveness of its financial 
system? 
The present essay argues that analyzing the Chinese financial system using market-based 
standards may not be valid and that the present Chinese financial system has never the less been 
effective in serving the development needs of China. Furthermore, although the Chinese 
financial system is not developed according to the standards of industrialized countries, 
financial intermediation has never the less been efficient in terms of promoting savings and 
credit to the extent that might have been good enough to facilitate economic growth.  
The essay is structured as follows.  
• Section 2 reviews selected institutional facts on the Chinese financial development and the 
progress accomplished after 1978.  
• Section 3 discusses different angles from which the performance of the Chinese financial 
system can be correctly assessed and it also focuses on financial policies. 
• Section 4 concludes the essay. 
 
2. Overview of the Chinese financial development  
To understand the Chinese financial system, it is important first to review the Chinese financial 
development in terms of institutions and development performance. The focus is on the banking 
sector since it accounts for most, if not all, of the financial activities in China. 
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2.1. Institutional Setting 
Since China adopted the reform and opening-up policy, its financial market has not only 
accommodated commercial banks, social security funds, trust companies, insurance companies 
and securities companies but it also has introduced, since 2003, qualified foreign institutional 
investors (QFII), which have played an important role in the development of the Chinese 
financial market. Furthermore, products in the financial market have gradually been diversified. 
While there are financial debts, treasury bonds, central bank bills, corporate equity and other 
products with features of debt, innovative securities and banking products have been 
continuously introduced (Zhou Xiaochuan. 2004) 
The financial assets of China are concentrated in the banking system; the capital markets are 
relatively small and bank loans remain the dominant source (above 80 percent) of funding for 
Chinese companies. No real corporate debt market exists. According to Ligang (2001), bank 
loans are the main source of finance in China. In 1998 bank loans represented 70 per cent of 
total financing, while equity financing accounted for only 6 per cent. Private commercial banks 
are a very small part of the market. Under the government’s guidance, the state banks have 
directed most of their funds to the State Owned Enterprises (hereafter SOEs) through ‘policy 
loans’ and direct credits at interest rates far below the market value. Loans are mainly short term, 
although there has been a recent trend toward medium- and long-term lending. 
Over 80 city commercial banks have approximately 4 percent of the domestic banking 
business. Urban credit cooperatives (about 3,200) have approximately 5 percent of the domestic 
banking business. Numerous (about 41,500) rural credit cooperatives and other small 
institutions have approximately 9 percent of the domestic banking business (Ligang, 2001). 
The banking sector is heavily concentrated around the big 4 state-owned banks (hereafter 
SOBs) that represent 60-70 percent of the domestic banking business, measured in terms of total 
assets. These big 4 banks are:  
• the Bank of China (traditionally responsible for foreign exchange activity and the 
financing of imports and exports),  
• the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (originally specialized in lending to the 
industrial sector),  
• the China Construction Bank (traditionally focused on financing infrastructure 
development) and  
• the Agricultural Bank of China (traditionally focused on agricultural lending and rural 
development).  
At the end of 2001, they had a 62 % share of the savings and lending business and an 80 % 
share of the payments business.  
   According to Xinghai (2001), the Chinese government carried out many reforms in the 
financial sector since 1995 notably Centralizing government control of large banks, insurance 
companies and stock exchanges; forcing the collectivization of urban credit unions; abolishing 
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loan quota and establishing asset management companies to deal with non-performing loans 
(hereafter NPL).  
To allow the rest of the SOBs to concentrate on more commercially-oriented lending, a new 
Commercial Banking Law (CBL) promulgated in 1995 emphasized the need for financial 
institutions to incorporate commercial criteria into their lending practices. The Chinese 
government set up three state banks with special functions: the State Development Bank, the 
Agricultural Development Bank of China and the Export and Import Bank of China, with the 
mission for implementing government steering policy and providing funds for reconstruction 
projects. 
Despite the introduction of the Central Bank Law, which gave sweeping powers to the 
People's Bank of China (PBOC) to implement monetary policy and to exercise financial 
supervision over the other financial institutions, the PBOC, hardly constituted an independent 
entity. The development of new financial products, and determination of interest rates on loans 
remain subject to government control. In his exhaustive study, Lardy (1998) points out the fact 
that — reminiscent of the central-planning era—almost all banks in China are state-owned.  
The high concentration of the banking sector is illustrated by the excessively high ratio of 
broad money (M2) to GDP, which indicates that financing relies too heavily on the banking 
system in the course of the economic development. Notwithstanding the trend of the high M2 
ratio over time, a pattern of strong and successful financial development in China has been 
confirmed.  
2.2. Financial Progress since 1978 
This section focuses on financial development, broadly defined to include improvement in 
the level of financial activity, the stability of the banking sector, and the quality of resource 
allocation as reflected in real sector performance (i.e., growth). Since the early 1980s, financial 
depth in China has been impressive. The real monetary balance has expanded at a rate faster 
than the real economy. Financial depth as measured by the ratio of M2 to GDP has increased 
from 24 percent in 1978 to 182 percent in 2004. This ratio increased by 30 percent in 1994-1999 
and by 50 percent in 1999-2004  
In comparative terms, the economic performance of China, compared to a similar transition 
economy such as Russia, has been remarkable. 1990, the level of loanable funds (proxied by 
M2/GDP ratio) was at 71% and 70% respectively for China and Russia. However, China moved 
to 103% in 1995 and 182% in 2004 while Russia shrunk to 21% in 1995 and 29% in 2004 (the 
last Russian figure is in fact what the Chinese level was in 1980 (IMF, 2004). Such a high level 
of financial depth puts China among the most advanced economies. This striking financial 
deepening is mainly due to two factors: the monetization of the economy and the expansion of 
household’s financial savings.  
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In 2001, households’ deposits accounted for 77.9% of quasi-money and 47.2% of broad money 
(Chen, 2003). 
Finally, domestic loans, taking the place of state budget appropriations, become the primary 
external source for financing capital investments. In 1981, state budgetary appropriation, 
financed 28.1% of total fixed asset investment, while the share of domestic loans was only 
12.7%. By 2001, the State budget had lost its importance, while loans became the primary 
means of external finance (Chen, 2003). 
An ultimate measure of financial development is the share of savings and time deposits in the 
M3 money stock. It shows the depth of financial intermediation in banking—how much credit there 
is available for long-term investment beyond the financing of short-term payments. 
This can be observed through the trend of money components over time.  
• The ratio of currency (outside banks) has evolved as follow: 20% of total money supply in 
1985, 17% in 1991 and 17% in 2003. 
• That of transaction deposits (demand deposits and checkable deposits) has moved from 
42% in 1985 to 31% and has remained constant since. 
• The ratio of non-transactions deposits (savings and time deposits) has increased sharply from 
38% in 1985 to 52% in 1991 and 58% in 2003 (Bernstam and Rabushka, 2004). 
Finally, commercial bank lending to firms and households as a percentage of GDP reached 
142 percent for China, which was twice that of the U.S. (at 70 percent). This dynamic picture 
shows how the Chinese banking sector has moved from transaction-related operations (short 
term activities) to a long-term resource system. By all these measures, China's financial system 
looks solid and capable of promoting sustained economic growth. 
The development of inter-bank markets in recent years has improved the liquidity of banks 
and other financial institutions and has aided the ability of the central bank to conduct monetary 
policy through open market operations. Open market operations have become a key policy 
instrument (Wang, 2000). By now China has basically established the securities futures market, 
the money market and the inter-bank foreign exchange market. Second, the financial market has 
fostered diversified participants. Products in the market have gradually been diversified. 
Compared with developed economies, however, the Chinese financial market is still lacking in 
product varieties and lacks sophistication.  
In recent times, China has accelerated joint-stock reform of the commercial banks, taking 
advantage of the strong economic growth momentum. According to Li (2004), commercial bank 
reform has undergone several important stages. For instance, in 1998 the Chinese government 
issued special treasury bonds amounting to RMB 270 billion yuan. The funds raised were 
subsequently used to recapitalize the state-owned commercial banks.  
• In 1999-2000, four asset management companies (AMCs) were established to take over 
part of the non-performing loans from the commercial banks.  
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• Second, commercial banks used their own resources including reserves, profit and capital, 
to write off non-performing loans.  
• Third, US$ 45 billion foreign exchange reserves were used to recapitalize two state-owned 
commercial banks - the Bank of China and China Construction Bank.  
The banking system as a whole has improved asset quality, capital adequacy and capacity to 
withstand risks (Li, 2004) 
The impressive economic growth happening in China has often been explained as 
essentially resulting from the huge capital inflows. While it may seem natural to argue that FDI 
may have been behind the strong economic growth rate in China, it is important to recognize 
that the spillovers for the host economy crucially depend on the extent of the development of 
domestic financial markets. There are different ways in which financial markets are significant. 
For instance, to take advantage of new investment and inherent new knowledge, local firms 
need to alter everyday activities and, more generally, reorganize their structure, buy new 
machines, and hire new managers and skilled labor. In most cases, external finance for doing 
these things is restricted to domestic sources. The lack of financial markets can also constrain 
potential entrepreneurs. FDI, without an efficient domestic financial system, cannot have the 
full/total/undiluted impact on economic growth.  
The private sector’s access to bank loans is still extremely limited. In the fourth quarter of 
1999 private enterprises received only 0.62 per cent of the loans from all banks, and less than 
0.5 per cent of all loans from state banks. This is despite the fact that private enterprises 
contributed nearly 35 per cent to industrial output in 1998 (Bernstam and Rabushka, 2004).
Judging by applying free-market economy standards, the financial services gap is found to 
be larger for developed countries. The Chinese financial institutions are plagued by poor asset 
quality, capital inadequacy and lack of diversification of its products. There exists a big gap 
between the Chinese and foreign financial institutions in terms of business operations, 
management skills and staff quality. In the 2nd quarter of 2004, non-performing loans recorded 
by the SOBs reached RMB1.8898 trillion accounting for 19.2 percent of their credit assets. 
Despite the success of the Chinese financial development, many critics have evoked 
numerous reasons highlighting its inefficiencies. Without denying some of their statements 
about inefficiency, however, there certainly are some areas in which their interpretations simply 









3. Chinese financial development: re-interpretation 
This section discusses the goals and effectiveness of the Chinese financial system as well as 
providing justification of selected policy choices taken by the authorities. 
3.1. Goals and effectiveness 
Every government wishes to have resources to serve its strategic goals. The objective of a 
State Owned Bank in a transition economy is to maximize the development impact of lending, 
subject to the necessary condition that its operations remain solvent. This objective is 
considerably different to that of a private commercial bank in a market economy. For instance, 
Chinese banks have been required to support government objectives ranging from the expansion 
of Government-chosen priority sectors to the expansion of unprofitable state-owned enterprises. 
Due to policy lending, the role of the central bank in reallocating loanable funds—from regions 
of high to low growth, and the continued reliance on administered interest rates—offer 
examples both of which suggest an environment in which financial institutions are part of the 
government bureaucracy and development institutions rather than part of market institutions. 
Financial intermediaries may not have directed financial resources efficiently in a strictly 
economic sense, but they have certainly achieved the development goal of income redistribution. 
This latter has consequently contributed to boost domestic demand as well as a cycle of 
income-savings generation across all provinces. 
Examining the productivity of investment funded through domestic loans using Chinese 
national level data Laurenceson and Chai (2001) concluded that Investment funded through 
domestic loans has been productive, at least when compared with other investment funding 
sources. Similar results were obtained by Liu and Li (2001) who attempted to shed light on the 
same issue using provincial level panel data. 
An example of an erroneous perception of the Chinese financial institutions is the focus on 
the high level of non-performing loans of SOBs. The ratio of Non-performing loans/listed 
capital of Chinese SOBs rose from 1.3 in 1993 to 6.0% in 1997, before falling to 4.7% in 1999. 
Although high by the standards of industrial economies, this ratio does not appropriately reflect 
the efficiency of financial institutions since the listed capital of those banks does not reflect their 
ultimate liabilities when their owner (the Chinese government) is willing to back them. 
The strength of banks is generally measured by the ratio of capital to assets; the size of reserves 
held relative to the quality of outstanding loans; profitability; and the margins between lending 
and deposit rates. The ratio of capital to assets of China’s 4 largest banks fell from 12.1 % in 
1985 to 2.2% in 1996 (Lardy. 1998) 
The profitability of Chinese banks was relatively stable at about 1.4% in 1985-1987 but has 
fallen sharply since then. During the 1990s, the reported profitability of Chinese banks 
compared reasonably well with that of major international banks in the mid-1980s. However, by 
the mid-1990s their returns were well below those of banks of comparable size in market 
 7
economies. Chinese banks in the mid-1990s look good only in comparison with large Japanese 
banks at the beginning of the current banking turmoil in Japan. (Lardy, 1998). 
According to Park & Sehrt (2001), the central Chinese government regards loans as a means 
for achieving regional equality. It uses the financial system, especially the state banking sector, 
for implicitly taxing rich provinces and subsidizing poor provinces: financial resources are 
channeled into poor provinces for supporting their credit expansion (Park and Sehrt, 2001). This 
argument is confirmed by Chen (2003) who demonstrated that provinces with a lower level of 
economic development have been receiving preferential credit treatment from the central 
government. Since it is influenced by political concerns, the actual loan distribution may differ 
from the optimum distribution according to economic fundamentals.  
The issue of efficiency has been based on the declining financial performance of SOBs, 
however, Laurenceson and Chai (2003) point out that such a decline does not reflect allocative 
inefficiency in the SOBs’ lending. This is because it has long been recognized that projects that 
have great development significance may only yield a marginal financial return. That is, due to 
the existence of market failures, there is often a large divergence between social and private 
returns to lending. For this reason, Stiglitz (1994) argues that there can be no presumption on 
the basis of economic theory that a liberalized financial sector will optimally allocate credit. The 
exclusive use of financial measures to gauge the performance of SOEs and SOBs is also 
inappropriate in that they are trying to satisfy a range of objectives (economic development 
objectives, social objectives, and so on) in contrast to firms and banks in a purely market 
economy that are solely attempting to maximize profits. 
Contrary to dire predictions of financial collapse, China demonstrated the robustness of its 
financial systems in that it was less vulnerable to financial fragility as compared to those countries 
badly hit during the Asian financial crisis. Financial fragility can impose heavy costs on taxpayers 
and disrupt the real economy through reduced availability of credit and other services such as 
payments (Goldstein and Turner, 1996). 
As Darwin told us, plants and animals evolve over time, and the survival of the individual 
and of the species as a whole depends on how well it fits with its environment. “Survival of the 
fittest” does not mean “Survival of the one that takes the most exercise”, it means survival of 
the species/individual that best matches its surroundings. The same applies to financial 
institutions. It is not the specific characteristic of a financial institution that makes it intrinsically 
‘useful’ or ‘not useful’, but how well that institution matches or fits the economic environment 
and overall development goals. The fit does not emerge naturally, but comes about in response 





3.2. Financial and Monetary Policies 
The usual way for a government to support particular activities is by controlling interest 
rates and sectoral credit allocation. China’s central bank has been keeping interest rates low to 
meet its development goals. Further, a review of the traditional missions of the 4 Chinese largest 
banks discussed in section 2 reveals a clear concentration of each of them on a particular sector, 
with a specific development orientation.  
One positive result of tight government control can be found in the China's remarkable 
immunity to the Asian financial crisis. In fact, the Chinese financial firms have not been able to 
take up risks (such as foreign currency risk or some derivatives risks) that could have lead them 
to a sudden collapse, as has occurred in some of China’s nearby countries during the Asia 
financial crisis (Xinghai, 2001). The partial convertibility of the Renminbi made it far less 
vulnerable to speculative attacks. The Renminbi was not convertible for capital account 
transactions. Instead, it was only convertible on the current account, which meant that official 
documentation of a legitimate trade or other approved transaction was required before 
permission can be obtained for changing money  
Direct intermediation controls such as credit ceilings specified in the annual credit plan have 
been of far greater consequence in China. This traditional tool of credit control set limits on the 
total lending of each financial institution and sub-ceilings for certain categories of loans (World 
Bank, 1990). Decisions about lending can only be made appropriately if bankers have the 
necessary inputs to make judgments about the risks and returns of the firms to whom they 
advance funds. Debtors need to make this information available through high levels of 
disclosure – an issue not just in the area of developing financial systems such as the Chinese one. 
In China, private firms find it difficult to communicate information about the firm to financial 
intermediaries. On their side, financial institutions, particularly SOBs, have little experience in 
assessing credit risk or the potential for profitable investment opportunities.  
To cope with problems generated by asymmetric information, financial restraint policies 
have proved to be necessary in China. The increased profitability of financial institutions due to 
financial restraint policies could lead to (a) more confidence on the part of savers in the stability 
of formal financial institutions and hence a greater willingness to hold financial assets 
independent of interest rate factors, and (b) increased investment in deposit collection 
infrastructure that will reduce the transaction costs incurred by savers when accessing the 
formal financial system. This will again have the effect of increasing financial depth in a 
manner independent of the interest rate. 
Chinese SOBs have generally held reserves that have been in excess of that required 
(Girardin, 1997); that simple fact may suggest that an increase in the reserve requirement may 
not actually lead to increase in the level of financial repression by reducing the overall level of 
intermediation provided by the SOBs. Given the fact that China has yet to establish a deposit 
insurance system, and that quite a number of financial institutions have failed to reach the 8% 
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capital adequacy ratio, the differentiated required reserve ratio scheme is conducive to curb 
excessive credit expansion of the financial institutions with low capital adequacy ratio and poor 
asset quality, and to prevent the one-size-fits-all approach in macro financial adjustment and 
regulation (Wu, 2004) 
The lending practices and central government control appears to be an effective monetary 
tool.  
Although proponents of the theory that financial repression occurs cites controlled interest 
rates as one of the tools of financial repression, the case of China has proved to be an exception. 
Even McKinnon (1994) has implicitly recognized the necessity to take recourse to financial 
restraint policies when admitting that China’s interest rate policy, particularly on saving 
deposits, remains very important in preserving the incentives of households and enterprises to 
build up their financial asset positions. Except in very short episodes of inflation (from 1988 to 
1990 and from 1993 through April 1996), Chinese authorities have been successful in 
maintaining a positive deposit rate in real terms by, for instance, instituting the so-called 
value-guarantee deposits (which were designed to insulate long-term deposits from inflation). 
Policies and reforms, either monetary or financial, are effective if and only if economic 
agents trust them to work in their interests. In China the general public’s confidence in the 
financial system has been and remains high. While it is generally admitted that financial 
liberalization improves banking efficiency, this might not be the case in China because of the 
very fact that banks are owned by the state reassures the depositors.  
The commitments China made when joining the WTO and the requirements of the Chinese 
economy itself call for the accelerated development of the financial market. The ratio of foreign 
trade to GDP in China has reached 60% in 2003. Viewed objectively, the Chinese financial 
institutions are required to provide corporate customers with a series of financial services such 
as arbitrage, risk control and FX cash management. The expansion of the market demand opens 
windows of opportunity for the development of the financial market and financial products. 
(Zhou Xiaochuan, 2004). 
Over the past decade Chinese financial systems have been going through major changes. 
These developments raise new questions and unlock new challenges. In order to provide an 
appropriate response to these new and changing circumstances, Chinese policymakers have 
engaged in further market-based interest rate reform, with significant progress achieved in the 
deregulation of money market interest rate. The floating band of interest rate on loans to small 
and medium sized enterprises has been enlarged to three times its original size, leading to 
improved risk management capability of the banks and enabling these enterprises to have easier 
access to bank credit. 
 
 
The solution to China’s financial problems depended in part on devising policies to use the 
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country’s high level of savings in an appropriate way. One mechanism would be to transform 
private savings – at present largely held as deposits with state banks – into bank capital. In this 
way, banks might meet the 8% capital requirement target. 
There is a need for a strong regulatory and supervisory framework for the smooth operation 
of the financial sector— for helping to improve efficiency, safety, liquidity, for increasing the 
efficient transfer of information, increasing diversity and adding to financial discipline.  
 
4. Conclusion and Perspectives 
The tremendous financial development achieved by China over the last two decades has 
been impressive in the areas of financial depth, savings mobilization and credit allocation. 
Dominated by state owned banks, the financial system has shown strength in channeling funds 
according to development plans. Financial depth has reached the level of advanced economies 
and financial intermediation in banking increased dramatically while shifting from short-term to 
long-term operations. Despite such success, critics have pointed out numerous inefficiencies. 
While some of those criticisms are valid in market economies, the present essay has emphasized 
the inappropriate character of strictly financial standards for judging Chinese SOBs’ efficiency.  
The robustness of the both the Chinese financial system and implemented policies have 
been seen, not only through the strong economic growth achieved, but also via the remarkable 
immunity of China to the Asian financial crisis. These two outcomes could not have been 
achieved if the financial system was inefficient or inadequate. Indicators such as the ratio of 
capital to assets and profitability may not fully make sense in a transition economy with strong 
socio-developmental emphasis (rather than adherence to strict financial considerations) and 
where most (if not all) institutions are still state-owned. In such a case, efficiency of institutions 
depends more on the willingness of the government to keep them operative and less on whether 
their capital can cover their assets or the lack of profits.  
In addition, the discussion also looked into the policies implemented by the Chinese 
authorities in the light of financial restraint, such as directed and sectoral credit allocation, rather 
than financial repression. These two perspectives allow getting a much better understanding of 
the Chinese financial system, which is compatible with the strong economic growth achieved by 
China since 1978. In many respects the misinterpretation of the Chinese financial development 
follows the common belief in financial development that an inherent tradeoff exists between 
social and financial return: greater social return implies lower financial return, and vice-versa. 
For most analysts, the practical consequence is the dominance of financial return over social 




In terms of global perspective, it should be noted that after joining the WTO, China has 
come to the stage where further financial market reform is critical to its ability to secure a 
successful integration into the global financial market. The Chinese financial sector has been 
effective in the past but it is unlikely to be strong enough to face competitive pressure from 
foreign institutions. Regarding future reforms, the level of non-performing loans and the risk of 
insolvency constitute major constraints on China’s plan to liberalize interest rates. Further, 
guidelines on BIS capital adequacy require that market reforms be accelerated and further 
recapitalization of the banking system be undertaken. More than in the past, the health of the 
Chinese financial system is going to play a central role in sustaining the global economy; 
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